THE COVER UP

It is immediately apparent to anyone with the slightest technical knowledge that the account given after 6 months “investigation” as related in the HSE Report letter of February 2012 [3] is entirely incorrect. An account which ignored the removal of the previous compliant system and described a situation which is a physical impossibility according to the only technical standard referred to in UK Regulations. (see fuller explanation under Faked Expert Report) The truth is the total lack of a legally admissible Fresh Air Supply system can be spotted in minutes and the required brief report to condemn the situation could literally be done the same day. The situation is equivalent to a car passing an MOT Test having had the brakes removed, but in that case lay people would not be so easily fooled. When the subject is not readily understood and the “mighty” HSE pass judgement with great authority, using “technical” expressions to lend credibility, they take for granted they will be believed without question. Unfortunately we know what happens when trust is taken for granted.

It is worth repeating the original 2008 complaint to HSE was about a wholly missing system, not just a poor or ineffective one. This was a major failure affecting hundreds of occupants which was not a matter of repair, adjustment or improvement. That a £1M or so new ventilation system was clearly needed was the crux of the complaint and the only reason for HSE’s belated agreement to investigate in late 2011. In doing so HSE effectively admitted the assurances they accepted without verification in 2008 (when they failed to even visit) had been entirely false. The HSE letter of 26.09.2011 [4] confirms they closed the case in 2008 based on assurances which must be false given the subsequent decision to investigate. The HSE do not provide a free “ventilation checking service” and they would not commit resources for 6 months to a minor matter. The cynical view would be they possibly spent one day realising the extent of the failure, then the remainder of the 6 months cobbling together some kind of cover story rather than admit the embarrassing truth.

HSE had used their specialists in HSL (Health and Safety Laboratories based in Buxton) to carry out the 2011 “investigation”. I took up the matter with HSL in early 2012 still hoping it was all a misunderstanding. I received a letter from their Dr Andrew Curran [5] who incredibly is now the Chief Scientific Officer at HSL. My questions were based on the contradiction between HSE’s account and the only technical standard referred to in any UK legislation which is CIBSE (Chartered Inst of Building Services Engineering) Guidance. Dr Curran’s area of expertise is Occupational Respiratory Health. His stating that under Workplace Regulations the standard applied only to new buildings and as such had not been applied to their tests was glaringly wrong. It invalidated any conclusion reached and cast further doubt on his competence and / or integrity. It already being the case the claimed method of testing was entirely spurious and proved absolutely nothing. They had used “calibrated” instruments to take an entirely meaningless measurement but at least it sounded impressive.

As part of their “investigation” HSE claim to have consulted staff in the building. I take this to be tacit admission they knew the requisite fresh air system was absent, but wanted to know whether staff would make an issue of it. Had a legal ventilation system been present there is nothing HSE could or would do about staff complaints. For HSE enforcement purposes this is a question of provable physical and legal fact, not one of staff opinion. Clearly staff were not able to speak freely, especially as they knew what had happened to myself and others who dared to question anything.. The true situation was as indicated by the attached management report and email from a Council Safety Officer [6] indicating the long running reported issues. The extract from the report indicates the intention to target the “worst offenders” causing an inexplicable unprecedented “spike” in infection related absences lasting several days rather than confront the obvious cause which was staff being moved into an unventilated building. This is a perfect textbook example of how to ignore a mountain of evidence and how not to deal with an obvious staff health issue.

Further emails to HSL resulted in the conflicting claim from their (then) Director Mr Eddie Morland that Emerson House had a “straight through” ventilation system. This was never explained but from research this is a term normally applied to an industrial building with a major fume issue. A reply to a letter in the trade press was met with the claim Emerson House “fully complied” with legal requirements, despite even their flawed report only claiming partial compliance if numbers of occupants were limited. Complaints to the HSE Chief Executive in accordance with the policy on their website at that time were simply referred back to the original investigatory team.

Explanatory Note for people not in the building industry. CIBSE “Guidance” is the “bible” for all Heating and Ventilation design and installation to new buildings or refurbishments. Government Regulations only state bald requirements and give no clue as to what systems need to consist of or avoid. Although termed “Guidance” and by a non-government body, this is the way by which technical standards are set in many areas. For example the technical standard determining the adequacy of scaffolding is Technical Guidance 20 (TG 20) by the National Access and Scaffolding Confederation. HSE and the industry determine soundness of scaffolds on the basis of TG 20. CIBSE “Guidance” is the only technical standard referred to under Health and Safety OR Building Regulations. It is a standard applied in numerous countries worldwide and other countries are represented on CIBSE Committees. CIBSE “Guide A” is effectively a “science text book” covering behaviour of air flows, human physiology, mechanics etc which are immoveable scientific facts just like the law of gravity. “Guide B” sets out how the science dictates the form of heating, ventilation etc systems including what key features they must have or avoid. Being directly science based standards and systems are obviously similar internationally. Guidance effectively says “systems work ONLY if they are within these rules and constraints”.

Note that at this point I actually directly sought the opinion of CIBSE’s Technical Branch, therefore the highest technical authority in the UK. Their Response of 2012_[7] confirmed I was correct and praised the “professional manner” I had gone about things with. Their circumspect technical reply gave details of alternative approaches to mechanical fresh air supply within their Guidance but nothing remotely like that suggested by HSE and no words of support for the HSE proposition. The HSE still refused to re-visit the issue despite seeing the CIBSE response and the documented proof that the removal I alleged had indeed taken place.

The tiny modest “egg crate” grille in

the Photo is adjacent to the draughty staircase doors but credited with sufficient power to “suck” air from the holes in the walls many metres away.

In truth the HSE’s measurement of the staircase draught going into the grille is a measure of absolutely no relevance at all as is specifically made clear in the ONLY technical documentation referred to under ALL legislation.

The reality is this is the “return” point for air when blown into the room by the original system Extract based systems apply only to small toilets or specific fume removal situations

I had no other option but embark on the tortuous complaint process reporting HSE to the PHSO (The Government’s Public and Health Service Ombudsman). The gross error in HSL’s letter (and therefore their whole assessment) was admitted by HSE’s then Director of Operations Rick Brunt in the letter dated 18^th April 2013_[8]. He admitted the critical wrong assertion on which basis PHSO went forward to the Full Formal Investigation Stage. Only about 1 in 7 complaints are referred on to this stage, following proof there is evidence to support the claim.

Mr Brunt’s “bluff and bluster” letter sums up the HSE’s approach. The critical admission of gross error is almost a “throw away” line with the emphasis on profoundly untrue counter claims delivered with smooth assurance by an HSE Director. He proclaims CIBSE Guidelines are only “optional best practice” despite being the only technical standard referred to in UK legislation and not naming the other “options” for achieving compliance he presumably claims to exist. The Government Regulations he quotes merely set the performance to be achieved but give no clue how to actually design, install or check that performance hence they refer to the universally applied CIBSE Guidance. His assertion that mechanical systems are not “necessary” contrary to Guidance in the context of a large sealed multi storey office block begs the question just when are they required?. Quite ludicrously he claimed the admitted error of failure to apply the only relevant methods of assessment did not affect the outcome of the investigation. Not even the PHSO believed Mr Brunt hence their referral to a full investigation.

Although no doubt fed with misleading information, Mr Brunt was responsible for the letter which bears his name. As one whose expertise is actually in Agriculture he would know that had the equivalent occurred to a farm animal housing it would have been condemned by the inspectors he is now in charge of. Even if the farm in question was owned by Capita and the animals had not complained verbally to the inspector…Shortly after writing his letter Mr Brunt was promoted back into the HSE Agriculture Section as the “Chief” having gained experience as a Director in an area of work he had little knowledge of. It was sufficient he had learnt how to deal with awkward questions the “HSE way”. Agriculture is statistically the most dangerous UK Industry so it’s good to know we have a man of such integrity and competence in charge.

The ponderous PHSO process went on for approximately 2 years culminating in a report by an “expert” they recruited to answer the crucial technical point. See the Faked Expert Report Section for the role HSE were allowed to play in influencing the final report.

Further communications with HSE have only led to them insisting the matter is closed having been fully investigated. They refuse to answer any specific technical points, explain any of the inconsistencies in their multiple conflicting accounts or answer as to why obvious visible evidence and established scientific fact are ignored. The letters by HSE Legal Director_[9] and current Chief Executive Richard Judge l10] summarise their stance. Needless to say it is unfortunate the threatened legal action did not materialise, it being most unlikely they could persuade an expert witness to commit perjury on their behalf.

HSE have given no comment in respect of this website being made available. They are fully aware that under their own guidelines for enforcement (including prosecution) any deliberately false statement could amount to Perverting the Course of Justice. Those guilty of this offence or of Serious Misconduct in Public Office normally receive significant prison sentences. In a recent HSE prosecution the sentences served by those responsible for a fatal accident were significantly increased due to their attempt at fabricating evidence. One would expect an HSE Official guilty of the same offence would receive very little sympathy from the Judge if found guilty. That is hypothetically speaking of course.

CONCLUSION ON H.S.E ACTIONS

If the evidence I put forward is genuine it follows HSE Officials have potentially committed crimes of Misconduct in Public Office and under the Health and Safety at Work Act. If official Vehicle Inspectors or Food Inspectors covered up equivalent offences it would be very readily understood and acted upon. Many public officials including Police Officers have been sentenced for such crimes. Although the facts are more technical, this case is no different legally.

The reason why HSE acted so incredibly out of character and against their legal duty requires investigation along with any obvious connections between the parties, including possibly the relatively close one between Capita and the HSE. The annual Capita Health and Safety Lecture is hailed by Capita as a “prestigious event in the health and safety calendar”, with the great and the good attending “by invitation only”.

Whether or not related it is a statement of obvious fact that correct enforcement action by HSE in 2008 would have prejudiced their appointment of Capita to run the massive Gas Safe Organisation (successor to “Corgi” ) at the exact same period that year. Ironically HSE awarded Capita an absolutely critical safety role, when arguably they could have been facing criminal prosecution as an Employer breaching a vital duty under the Workplaces Regulations. A duty they had already failed to address as the Council Building Control Body actually occupying the building!

In the final analysis this potentially critical Circumstantial Evidence and all other aspects of the case will require Police Investigation. At the present time the Greater Manchester Police decline to investigate on the basis the matter has been dealt with by the HSE. Predictably they deem it impossible HSE officials could have concealed the truth or acted in the way the evidence indicates. The time honoured tradition of Police Forces refusing to look at evidence of public scandals until they read it in the national media looks likely to prevail.